Ten regressions across both prongs of the #29507 fix, organised so each
test names exactly which way the bug could come back:
Prong 1 — ``force_close_tcp_sockets``:
* ``shutdown_only_no_close`` is the smoking-gun assertion. If a future
refactor adds back ``sock.close()`` to this helper, the FD-recycling
race that wrote TLS bytes on top of ``kanban.db`` is back, and this
trips.
* ``uses_shut_rdwr`` pins that both halves are shut down (a half-close
wouldn't unblock a worker stuck in ``recv``).
* ``swallows_oserror_on_shutdown`` covers the already-shutdown case.
* ``handles_multiple_pool_entries`` walks all pool connections.
Prong 2 — thread-aware ``_close_request_client_once``:
* ``stranger_thread_aborts_only_no_close`` simulates the asyncio_0 →
Thread-1616 interrupt path: stranger drives abort, holder stays
populated for the worker's eventual finally.
* ``owner_thread_pops_and_full_close`` is the worker-thread path: pops
+ full close.
* ``stranger_then_owner_close_sequence_runs_full_close_exactly_once``
replays the reporter's exact timeline at object level: abort runs
once, full close runs once, holder ends empty.
Agent surface:
* ``_abort_request_openai_client_does_not_call_client_close`` pins
that the new entrypoint shuts sockets and emits the
``deferred_close=stranger_thread`` marker but never calls
``client.close()``.
* ``_abort_request_openai_client_null_client_is_noop`` defensive.
End-to-end:
* ``fd_recycle_window_closed_by_shutdown_only`` reproduces the race
at object level — runs the abort path from a stranger thread and
asserts that no ``close()`` ever fires, so the kernel can never
recycle the FD under the owner's still-active reference.
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